A ring signature is an anonymous signature that implements both the authentication of the message and the anonymity of the signer. In a ''normal'' ring signature scheme, the same signer can generate multiple ring signatures, but the verifier cannot find this fact. Linkable ring signature (LRS) solves the problem. In the setting, the identity of the signer is still anonymous, and if the same signer generates multiple ring signatures, the verifier can confirm the fact. Linkable ring signatures are applied to some actual scenarios, such as e-cash, e-voting and ad-hoc network authentication. In this paper, we presented a new identity-based linkable ring signature scheme that avoids certificate management. We then gave the security proofs in the random oracle model (ROM) and compared the efficiency of it with the previous schemes. The new scheme requires only 7 pairing operations in signing and verifying. It is the most efficient linkable ring signature in the identity-based setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
In conventional public key infrastructure (PKI), a user is bound to his public key by a digital certificate, which is issued by a reliable certification authority (CA). In this setting, the certificate management, storage and transfer lead to increase the associated computation cost. To solve the problem, Shamir [20] put forward identity-based public key cryptography (IBPKC). In this setting, the public key of a user is his identity information, the private key is generated by a trusted private key generator (PKG) according to his public key. PKG does not need to maintain a list of certificates. Each user needs to store only the system parameters.
In 2001, Rivest et al. [19] proposed the notion of the ring signature ( Fig. 1 ). In this concept, a signer selects several users to form a group including himself, then signs a message on behalf of the group without the help of the other group members. By verifying the signature, the verifier is sure that signature was generated by someone in the group, but he cannot find the real signer from the group.
A ''normal'' ring signature is unlinkable, in other words, the verifier knows nothing about whether two signatures are produced by the same signer. In 2004, Liu et al. [15] put forward the concept of linkable ring signature (LRS). In this The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Liehuang Zhu . setting, the identity of actual signer is still anonymous, two ring signatures must be linked if they are generated by the identical signer. Link-ability can happen only if the ring signatures are within the same event, that is to say, the signatures from dissimilar events must be unlinkable, even if they are generated by the identical signer.
LRS is appropriate in some actual scenarios, such as e-cash, e-voting and ad-hoc network authentication. Take an example, ''normal'' ring signature is not suitable for e-voting on account of all votes are unlinkable, that is, anyone is unable to determine whether two votes are generated by the identical voter or not. LRS solves the problem by permitting the verifier(votes supervisor) to detect the votes produced by the identical voter.
A. RELATED WORK
In 2016, Zhang et al. [28] constructed two ring signature schemes based on number theory research unit lattices, these two schemes were proved to be secure under the chosenmessage attacks. In 2018, Chen et al. [7] presented a ring signature scheme and a group signature scheme based on q-ary identification protocols, these two schemes are resistant to quantum attacks. Qin et al. [18] proposed a ring signature scheme with constant-size based on accumulator, and gave the security proofs in the random oracle model. In 2019, Huang et al. [12] designed three leakage-resilient ring signature schemes based on bounded leakage model.
In 2002, Zhang and Kim [27] put forward the first identitybased ring signature (IBRS) scheme. In 2005, Chow et al. [5] constructed a new IBRS scheme that needs only two pairing operations. In 2007, Herranz [10] designed two IBRS schemes based on RSA, that don't require pairings operation. In 2014, Deng and Zeng [8] proposed two identity-based threshold ring signature schemes, the 1st scheme requires only two pairing operations, the 2nd scheme dose not use Lagrange interpolation polynomial. In 2015, Wang et al. [24] put forward an identity-based quotable ring signature scheme. Using it, new ring signatures on substrings can be derived from the original ring signature.
In 2004, Liu et al. [15] constructed the first LRS scheme and proved it to be secure under the random oracle model, they then proposed a one-round e-voting system based on it. Tsang et al. [21] proposed the notions of accusatory linkability and non-slanderability, and presented the first separable linkable threshold ring signature(LTRS) scheme. In 2005, Liu and Wong [16] introduced strong security model for adapting to new attacking scenarios, and constructed two LRS schemes based on zero knowledge proof. In 2007, Zheng et al. [26] put forward a LRS scheme based on linear feedback shift register. In these schemes [16] , [21] , [26] , the size of signature expands linearly with the size of group. In 2005, Tsang et al. [22] presented a short LRS scheme based on link decisional RSA assumption, which achieved a constant size signature. Fujisaki [9] and Yuen et al. [25] constructed a new LRS scheme, respectively. These two schemes were proved to be secure in the standard model, and the size of signatures grows linearly with √ n where n is the size of group. Jeong et al. [13] and Liu et al. [17] constructed a LRS scheme, respectively. These two schemes achieved unconditional anonymity. In 2018, Baum et al. [3] presented a LRS scheme by a lattice-based collision-resistant hash function. Boyen and Haines [4] proposed a LRS scheme that implements forward-secure key updates and unconditional anonymity. All the above schemes are in traditional public key setting.
In 2006, Chow et al. [6] and Au et al. [1] put forward an identity-based linkable ring signature (IBLRS) scheme, respectively. These two schemes achieved a constant [14] pointed to that the scheme [1] is insecure. In 2010, Tsang et al. [23] constructed an identity-based threshold ring signature scheme. In 2013, Au et al. [2] proposed a IBLRS scheme and gave the security proofs in ROM.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
There are two IBLRS schemes [2] , [6] in the literature. In the scheme [2] , one user can correspond to multiple private keys, in other words, the user's private key is not determined solely by the master key and the identity of the user, which is different from the setting of traditional identity based cryptography. The two schemes [2] , [6] require more than 10 pairing operations, which increases the computational burden of the signer and the verifier.
It is quite significant to design an efficient and secure IBLRS scheme. The contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We presented the system model of IBLRS and gave the definition of the security attributes: unforgeability, anonymity, linkability, non-slanderability, unlinkability.
• We constructed a new linkable ring signature scheme from identity-based cryptography. It avoids certificate management in traditional public key infrastructure.
• We proved that the new scheme is secure in the random oracle model under the assumption that computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem and decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem are intractable.
• We gave a comparison of the efficiency of the new scheme and previous schemes. The new scheme requires 7 times pairing operations which does not rely on the number of members included in the group, it is more efficient than previous ones.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, bilinear pairing and computation Diffie-Hellman problem are introduced. They are used in the construction and the security proofs for the new scheme. The notations used throughout the paper are listed in Table 1 .
A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a mapping with the following properties, where G 1 = (P) and G 2 are an additive group with q order and a multiplicative group with q order.
• Bilinearity: e(aP 1 , bP 2 ) = e(P 1 , P 2 ) ab for all P 1 , P 2 ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z q .
• Non-degeneracy: There exist P 1 , P 2 ∈ G 1 such that e(P 1 , P 2 ) = 1 G 2 .
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P 1 , P 2 ) for all P 1 , P 2 ∈ G 1 .
B. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
Definition 1: Computation Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. For P ∈ G 1 , given the tuples (P, aP, bP), computate abP.
Definition 2: Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem. Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear pairing. For P ∈ G 1 and Y ∈ G 2 , given the tuples (P, aP, bP, cP, Y ), decide whether Y = e(P, P) abc .
C. SYSTEM MODEL
An identity-based linkable ring signature scheme is made up of the following five algorithms:
• Setup: On input a security parameter k, PKG outputs params (system parameters) and msk (master secret key).
• Key-Extract: On input the identity of a user ID i ∈ {0, 1} * and msk, PKG outputs a private key D i .
• Sign: On input a tuple (event, M , W , D s ), the actual signer ID s ∈ W outputs a ring signature σ .
• Verify: On input a tuple (σ, event, M , W ), the verifier outputs 1 or 0, according to whether σ is a valid ring signature.
• Link: On input two valid signature-message pairs (σ 1 , M 1 ; σ 2 , M 2 ) on same event description event, the verifier outputs link or unlink.
D. SECURITY MODEL
The following queries will be carried out between a challenger C and an adversary A , which together simulate the ability of the adversary.
• Hash functions query: A may request the values of the hash functions for any input.
• Key query: A requests the key of a user ID i , C responds with the key D i .
where ID s ∈ W , C outputs a signature. An IBLRS scheme must have the following security properties:
• Unforgeability: A can not give a valid signature on W if he did not get the key of anyone in W .
• Anonymity: For a valid signature, A cannot determine who is the true signer.
• Linkability: Two different signatures with the same event generated by identical actual signer must be linkable.
• Non-slanderability: If A does not get the private key of the real signer for the known signature, he cannot generate a new signature that can be linked with the previous signature.
• Unlinkability: Two different signatures with different events generated by identical actual signer must be unlinkable. Next, the definition of these security attributes will be given separately in the way of the game.
Definition 3: In the following game, if the advantage of the adversary is negligible, the IBLRS scheme is said to be unforgeable (UNF-IBLRS).
Game I: A adversary A plays a game with a challenger C as follows.
Initialization: Running the Setup algorithm, C obtains the params and then gives it to the A .
Query: A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries.
Forge: A outputs a new tuple (σ * , event * , M * , W * ). The adversary wins if the following conditions hold: 1) Verify (σ * , event * , M * , W * ) = 1.
2) A did not query the key of anyone in W * .
3) (σ * , event * , M * , W * ) is not obtained through a signature query The advantage of A is defined as:
Definition 4: In the following game, if the advantage of the adversary is negligible, the IBLRS scheme is said to be anonymous (ANO-IBLRS).
Game II: A adversary A plays a game with a challenger C as follows.
Initialization: Same as that in Game I. Phase 1: A makes a polynomially bounded number of queries.
Challenge: A submits a tuple (event, M , ID * 0 , ID * 1 , W ). C randomly picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and provides A with σ =Sign(event, M , W , D * µ ). Which must comply with the following constraints.
1) ID * 0 , ID * 1 ∈ W . 2) A did not make the key query for ID * 0 and ID * 1 . 3) A did not make the signature query for the tuple (event, * , ID * i , * ) for i = 0, 1. Phase 2: A carries on probing C with the same kind of queries made in Phase 1, and must comply with the following constraints.
1) A can not make the key query for ID * 0 and ID * 1 . 2) A can not make the signature query for the tuple (event, * , ID * i , * ) for i = 0, 1. Response: A returns a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary wins the game if µ = µ. The advantage of A is defined as:
Definition 5: In the following game, if the advantage of the adversary is ignorable, the IBLRS scheme is said to be linkable (LINK-IBLRS) for the same event.
Game III: A adversary A plays a game with a challenger C as follows. VOLUME 7, 2019 Initialization, Query: Same as that in Game I. Unlink: A outputs two valid signatures (σ 1 , event, M 1 ,W 1 ) and (σ 2 , event, M 2 , W 2 ). The adversary wins if following conditions hold:
1) The two signatures (σ 1 , event, M 1 , W 1 ) and (σ 2 , event, M 2 , W 2 ) are not obtained through signature queries. 2) A gets at most one user's key in
The advantage of A is defined as:
Definition 6: In the following game, if the advantage of the adversary is ignorable, the IBLRS scheme is said to be nonslanderable (NS) for the same event.
Game IV: A adversary A plays a game with a challenger C as follows.
Initialization, Phase 1: Same as that in Game II.
Challenge: A submits a tuple (event, M , ID s , W ), where ID s ∈ W and A did not query the key of ID s . C generates D s according to Key-Extract algorithm, then produces a signature (σ, event, M , W ) using D s and gives it back to A .
Phase 2: Same as that in Game II. And A can not query the key of ID s .
Slander: A gives a valid signature (σ , event, M , W ). The adversary wins if following conditions hold:
1) The signature (σ , event, M , W ) is not obtain through a signature query. 2) Link(σ, σ ) = link. The advantage of A is defined as:
Definition 7: In the following game, if the advantage of the adversary is ignorable, the IBLRS scheme is said to be unlinkable (UL-IBLRS) for the different event.
Game V: A adversary A plays a game with a challenger C as follows.
Initialization, Query: Same as that in Game I. Link: A outputs two valid signatures (σ 1 , event 1 , M 1 , W 1 ) and (σ 2 , event 2 , M 2 , W 2 ). The adversary wins if following conditions hold: 1) event 1 = event 2 .
2) The two signatures (σ 1 , event 1 , M 1 , W 1 ) and (σ 2 , event 2 , M 2 , W 2 ) are not obtained through signature queries.
3)
A gets at most one user's key in W 1 W 2 . 4) Link(σ 1 , σ 2 ) = link. The advantage of A is defined as:
III. NEW SCHEME
In this section, a new IBLRS scheme is constructed as follows.
• Setup: On input a security parameter k, PKG does as follows.
1) Selects two groups G 1 and G 2 having prime order q > 2 k , a generator P of G 1 and a bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . 2) Selects three cryptographic hash functions H 1 , H 2 :
q as the master secret key, sets P pub = xP as the public key. 4) Publishes the public parameters: params = {G 1 , G 2 , q, e, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 }.
• Key-Extract: On input the identity of a user ID i , PKG computes Q i = H 1 (ID i ), D i = xQ i , then sends D i to the user by a dependable channel.
• Sign: On input a tuple (event, M , W ), the actual signer ID s ∈ W performs the following steps.
c n ) as the signature.
• Verify: On receive a tuple (σ, enent, M , W ), the verifier carries out the following steps:
If the equality holds, outputs 1. Otherwise, outputs 0.
• Link: On receive two tuples (σ 1 = (T 1 , ·), event, M 1 , W 1 ), (σ 2 = (T 2 , ·), event, M 2 , W 2 ), the verifier checks if both σ 1 and σ 1 are two valid signature. If yes, outputs link if T 1 = T 2 and outputs unlink otherwise.
IV. SECURITY OF SCHEME
In this section, the security proofs of the new scheme are given. Theorem 1: In ROM, the scheme is unforgeable if CDH problem is hard.
Proof: Suppose that challenger C gets a stochastic example (aP, bP) of CDH problem and his objective is to compute abP.
Initialization: Executing the Setup algorithm, C gives A the params = {G 1 , G 2 , q, e, P, P pub = aP, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 }.
Queries: A will require H 1 (ID i ) before an identity ID i is used in arbitrarily other queries. Several lists are set to store the queries and answers, they are initially empty.
• H 1 queries: C maintains list L 1 of tuple (ID i , t i ). When A issues a query H 1 (ID i ), C responds as follows: At the j th query, sets ID j = ID and Q ID = bP. For i = j, C randomly picks t i ∈ Z * q and returns Q i = t i P, the query and answer then be stored in list L 1 .
When A issues this query on ID i . If ID i = ID , C fails and stops. Otherwise, C finds (ID i , t i ) in list L 1 , computes D i = t i aP, returns D i to A and adds (ID i , D i ) to list L D . 
If collision occurs, repeats the steps 2-5. 6) Outputs σ = (T , V , c 1 , · · · , c n ) as the signature.
Forge: A outputs a forged signature (σ * = (T * , V * , c * 1 , · · · , c * n ), event * , M * , W * ), and fulfills the conditions in Definition 2.
Solve CDH Problem: To generate the forged signature σ * = (T * , V * , c * 1 , · · · , c * n ) on the tuple (event * , M * , W * ), A must query H 3 (event * , M * , T * , A * , B * , W * ). Without losing generality, it is assumed that is done at the l th query of H 3 and C returned h * . Since h * = c * 1 + · · · + c * n and H 3 is a secure hush function, there is at least a λ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} such that c * λ is determined after h * is returned by C .
Follow on, C rewinds with the same input tape for A and answer all queries consistently except h * returned by the l th H 3 query. Therefore A produces another forged signature σ * = (T * , V * , c * 1 , · · · , c * n ), where h * = c * 1 + · · · + c * n . Since h * = h * and c * λ is determined after h * is returned by C , it implies that c * λ = c * λ and c * i = c * i for i = λ. It follows that V * = V * . If ID * s = ID and s = λ, then 1, 2, 3) and q D be the number of H i (i = 1, 2, 3) queries and key queries, respectively. Some events are denoted as follows:
π 1 : C does not fail in time of the key queries. π 2 : ID ∈ W * . π 3 : ID is the actual signer.
It is not difficult to get following results:
According to the forking lemma for ring signature [10] , if A can forge a valid signature with probability ε ≥ Proof: Suppose that challenger C gets a stochastic example (P, aP, bP, cP, Y ) of DBDH problem and his objective is to determine whether Y = e(P, P) abc .
Initialization: Same as that in Theorem 1.
Phase 1:
A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries as those in Theorem 1.
Challenge: A submits a tuple (event, M , ID 0 , ID 1 , W ) obeying the constraints in the Game II. If ID * 0 = ID and ID * 1 = ID , C aborts. Otherwise, ID * 0 = ID or ID * 1 = ID . C sets ID s = ID = ID * µ and computes the signature as follows.
1) Randomly chooses u ∈ Z * q and sets E = u · cP.
6) Adds E = H 2 (event) to list L 2 and h = H 3 (event, M , T , A, B, W ) to list L 3 . If collision occurs, repeats the steps 1-6. 7) Outputs σ = (T , V , c 1 , · · · , c n ) as the signature. Phase 2: A executes queries that conform to the constraints in the Game II.
Response: A returns a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}. Solve DBDH Problem: σ is a valid ring signature in ROM. If µ = µ, C outputs ''1''. Otherwise, C outputs ''0''. If Y = e(P, P) abc , then T = Y u = e(P, P) uabc = e(ucP, abP) = e(E, D * µ ). It follows that ID * µ is the actual signer. If A has advantage ε in distinguishing µ, then Pr[C → 1|Y = e(P, P) abc ]=Pr[µ = µ|Y = e(P, P) abc ]= 1 2 + ε. If Y = e(P, P) abc , then ID * 0 and ID * 1 are not true signers. So A has no advantage in distinguishing µ. Hence Pr[C → 1|Y = e(P, P) abc ]=Pr[µ = µ|Y = e(P, P) abc ]= 1 2 . Probability: Let q H i (i = 1, 2, 3) and q D be the number of H i (i = 1, 2, 3) queries and key queries, respectively. Two events are denoted as follows:
π 1 : C does not fail in time of the key queries. π 2 : ID * 0 = ID or ID * 1 = ID . It is not difficult to get following results:
Therefore, C can determine whether Y = e(P, P) abc with the probability 2·ε q H 1 if A can win in the Game II with the adversary ε.
Lemma 1: In ROM, if an adversary A produced a valid signature σ = (T , V , c 1 , · · · , c n ) on a tuple (event, M , W ), then he must have obtained the actual signer's key D s (where ID s ∈ W ), Proof: Performing the Setup algorithm, C gives A the params = {G 1 , G 2 , q, e, P, P pub = xP, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 }.
Queries: A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries.
• H 1 queries: C maintains list L 1 of tuple (ID i , t i ). When A issues a query H 1 (ID i ), C randomly picks t i ∈ Z * q , returns Q i = t i P and adds (ID i , t i ) to list L 1 .
• H 2 , H 3 queries: Same as those in the Theorem 1.
• Key queries: C maintains list L D of tuple (ID i , D i ).
When A issues this query on ID i . C finds (ID i , t i ) in list L 1 , computes D i = t i xP, returns D i to A and adds (ID i , D i ) to list L D .
• Signature queries: When A issues this query on a tuple (event, M , ID i , W ), C gets the private key D i by calling Key-Extract algorithm, then outputs a signature σ by running the Sign algorithm. Suppose that A produced a valid signature σ = (T , V , c 1 , · · · , c n ) on a tuple (event, M , W ) in the first run, where T = e(E, X ) for some X ∈ G 1 . C rewinds A to obtain second signature σ = (T , V , c 1 , · · · , c n ), where the tuple (event, M , W ), the parameters A, B ∈ G 2 and the actual signer's key X ∈ G 1 are same during both signatures. C gives two different outputs h, h for the input H 3 (event, M , T , A, B, W ) and answers all other queries consistently in two different signatures.
Since h = c 1 + · · · + c n , h = c 1 + · · · + c n , h and h are the output of the random oracle, there exists an element c s (c s )(1 ≤ s ≤ n), which is determined after h(h ) is returned. It follows that c s = c s and c i = c i for i = s. It implies (H (event) , D s ). It follows that X = D s . Hence A must have obtained the value D s .
Theorem 3: In ROM, the scheme is linkable for the same event.
Proof: Performing the Setup algorithm, C gives A the params = {G 1 , G 2 , q, e, P, P pub = xP, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 }.
Query: Same that in Lemma 1.
Unlink: A outputs two signatures (σ 1 , event, M 1 , W 1 ) and (σ 2 , event, M 2 , W 2 ), which meet the requirements in the Game III.
Since σ 1 = (T 1 , ·) and σ 2 = (T 2 , ·) are unlinkable, then T 1 = T 2 , where T 1 = e(E, D s 1 ), D s 1 = xH (ID s 1 ), ID s 1 ∈ W 1 , T 2 = e(E, D s 2 ), D s 2 = xH (ID s 2 ), ID s 2 ∈ W 2 . By Lemma 1, A must have obtained the values D s 1 and D s 2 . It contradicts with A gets only one user's key in W 1 W 2 .
Therefore, the advantage of A is negligible in the Game III.
Theorem 4: In ROM, the scheme is non-slanderable for the same event.
Phase 1: A makes queries as those in the proof of Lemma 1.
Challenge: A submits a tuple (event, M , ID s , W ), where ID s ∈ W and A did not query the key of ID s . C computes D s = xH (ID s ), then generates a signature (σ = (T , ·), event, M , W ) using D s and gives it to A .
Phase 2: A makes queries as those in the proof of Lemma 1.
Slander: A gives a valid signature (σ = (T , ·), event, M , W ) that fulfills the conditions in the Game IV.
By Lemma 1, A must have obtained the signer's key D s = xH 1 (ID s ). Since the two signatures are linkable, then T = T , where T = e(H (event), D s ), T = e(H (event), D s ). It follows that D s = D s , which implies that ID s = ID s . That is to say, A must have obtained the value D s , it contradicts with A does not obtain the key of ID s . Therefore, the advantage of A is negligible in the Game IV.
Theorem 5: In ROM, the scheme is unlinkable for the different event if the underlying hash function H 2 is collision resistant.
Unlink: A outputs two signatures (σ 1 , event 1 , M 1 , W 1 ) and (σ 2 , event 2 , M 2 , W 2 ), which meets the requirements in the Game V.
Since σ 1 = (T 1 , ·) and σ 2 = (T 2 , ·) are linkable, then T 1 = T 2 , where T 1 = e(H 2 (event 1 ), D s 1 ), T 2 = e(H 2 (event 2 ), D s 2 ). By Lemma 1, A must have obtained the values D s 1 and D s 2 . According to the requirements in the Game V, A gets at most one user's key in W 1 W 2 , so D s 1 = D s 2 . It implies that H 2 (event 1 ) = H 2 (event 2 ). It contradicts with H 2 is a secure hash function.
Therefore, the advantage of A is negligible in the Game V.
V. EFFICIENCY AND COMPARISON
In this section, performance analysis of three IBLRS schemes are presented. Several notations are defined as follows.
B P : a pairing operation. M G 1 : a scalar multiplication operation in G 1 . E G 2 : an exponentiation operation in G 2 . H P : a hash-to-point operation. For fairness and reasonableness, third-party data is used to analyze several IBLRS schemes. Using the cryptographic library(MIRACL) and executing the operations on a computer (Dell with an I5-4460S 2.90GHz processor, 4G bytes memory and the Window 8 operating system), He et al. [11] obtained the time overhead on basic cryptographic operations ( Table 2 ).
In the experiments, the security level is set to 1024-bit RSA security. In order to meet this requirement, a Tate pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is used, where G 1 is an additive group with q order, which is defined on a super singular curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 + 1, where the sizes of q and p are 160 bits and 512 bits, respectively.
Let n be the number of users included in the group. Table 3 (Fig. 2) .
VI. CONCLUSION
In the literature, there exist two linkable ring signature schemes based on identity [2] , [6] . In the scheme [2] , one user may correspond to multiple private keys, in other words, the user's private key is not determined solely by the master key and the identity of the user, which is different from the setting of traditional identity based cryptography. In this paper, a new IBLRS scheme is presented. In ROM, the security proofs of the scheme were given under the assumption that it is hard to solve CDH problem. The scheme requires only 7 pairing operations. Performance analysis shows that the new scheme is more efficient than the two schemes [2] , [6] .
